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In this essay, I will outline the positive content of George Grant’s con-
ception of “particularity” and clarify it by comparing it to Reiner 
Schürmann’s similar concept of “singularity” as a starting point for an 
engagement with the positive good to which it refers. In conclusion, a 
five-step existential logic will be presented, which, I will suggest, can 
resolve the important aspects of the difference between them. 
 
George Grant was a critic of technological civilization. As such, his 
search for “intimations of deprival” overshadowed an articulation of the 
positive good that was threatened or destroyed by technological civiliza-
tion1—so much so that he has been taken as a negative theologian, one 
whose task was exclusively to point to what is missing in contemporary 
experience and thought, in order that what is whole and good might be-
come manifest in a voiceless intuition incapable of philosophical expres-
sion. Positive expression of the endangered good is necessarily difficult 
in the era of its eclipse, but it nonetheless plays a central role in Grant’s 
work in motivating the critique of technological civilization. This posi-
tive good was referred to as “particularity”’ or “one’s own,” throughout 
his work2 and in one later formulation as “the good of heterogeneity, 	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Grant first used this phrase in “A Platitude,” in Technology and Empire 
(Toronto: Anansi, 1969), 139, and reprised it later in “Faith and the Multi-
versity,” in Technology and Justice (Toronto: Anansi, 1986), 33, 43. The persis-
tence of this phrase over nearly twenty years of mature thinking indicates that it 
can stand as a short indication of the purpose of Grant’s critiques of technologi-
cal civilization. 
2 Grant’s use of the term “one’s own” may well be an English rendering of 
Heidegger’s “Eigentlich,” which is usually translated as “authenticity.” The 
interchangeability of this term with “particularity” in Grant’s usage may account 
for some nuances in meaning, as well as its Heideggerian resonances. One might 
even speculate that it is the resonances of “one’s own” that explain Grant’s tena-
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which in its most profound past form was an expression of autoch-
thony.”3 The positive good of particularity, which implies heterogeneity, 
grounds Grant’s fundamental philosophical assertion that “love is con-
sent to the fact that there is authentic otherness” and  that “we love oth-
erness, not because it is other, but because it is beautiful.”4 Technological 
civilization denies this truth because “anything apprehended as resource 
cannot be apprehended as beautiful.”5 His philosophical work was there-
fore oriented to a retrieval and contemporary vindication of the lost be-
lief that “justice is something in which we participate as we come to 
understand the nature of things through love and knowledge.”6 Such 
intertwining of love and knowledge stems from the influences of Athens 
and Jerusalem in Grant’s thought, which he attempted to synthesize into 
a Christian Platonism.7 To the extent to which it can be brought to know-
ledge, the concept of particularity forms the groundwork of a philosophi-
cal critique of technological civilization. In this essay, I will outline the 
positive content of Grant’s conception of “particularity” and clarify it by 
comparing it to Reiner Schürmann’s similar concept of “singularity” as a 
starting point for an engagement with the positive good to which it re-
fers. In conclusion, a five-step existential logic will be presented, which, 
I will suggest, can resolve the important aspects of the difference be-
tween them. 
 
 
 
 	   	   _______________________	  
cious use of “particularity.” On this terminology, see Ian Angus, A Border 
Within: National Identity, Cultural Plurality and Wilderness (Montreal and 
Kingston: McGill-Queen's Press, 1997), 77–81. 
3 George Grant, “Thinking about Technology,” in Technology and Justice 
(Toronto: Anansi, 1986), 24. 
4 George Grant, “Faith and the Multiversity,” 38, 39. 
5 Ibid., 51. 
6 Ibid., 60. 
7 For a critique of the relation between Athens and Jerusalem in Grant’s thought, 
see Ian Angus, “Athens and Jerusalem? A Critique of the Relation between Phi-
losophy and Religion in George Grant’s Thought,” Journal of Canadian Studies, 
vol. 39, no. 2 (Spring 2005). 
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1. The Location and Exigency of George Grant’s Retrieval of Par-
ticularity 
 
In Lament for a Nation, Grant addressed the larger context of Canada’s 
loss of independence. Political and economic integration with the United 
States had taken place because the American empire represented the 
most advanced force of modernity. The universal and homogeneous state 
organized to dominate nature necessarily uproots traditions and loyalties 
tied to specific places. The term “particularity” was introduced in opposi-
tion to universalism. “The belief in Canada’s continued existence has al-
ways appealed against universalism. It appealed to particularity against 
the wider loyalty to the continent. If universalism is the most ‘valid mod-
ern trend,’ then is it not right for Canadians to welcome our integration 
into the empire?”8 While this might be, if left unqualified, a simply paro-
chial defence, there was an immediate implication that the universality of 
the universal state left something to be desired. “Only those who reject 
that goal and claim that the universal state will be a tyranny, that is, a 
society destructive of human excellence, can assert consistently that pa-
rochial nationalisms are to be fought for.”9 If the universal state must be 
a tyranny, this must be either because universality necessarily implies 
tyranny as its political form or because the universal state is, in a sense to 
be determined, a specific sort of universality that is deficient in a respect 
that implies tyranny as its political expression. Grant’s commitment to 
the universality of Christian Platonism assured that it is the latter course 
which he followed—though we will encounter the former subsequently 
through the concept of singularity. 
 The last paragraph of the book states that “[m]y lament is not 
based on philosophy but on tradition,”10 which I understand to mean that 
his attachment to this particular tradition, not the articulation of what is 
deficient in that universality itself, motivated his rejection of univer-
sality.  The deficiency is pointed to by the observation that it yields tyr-
anny in its political instantiation, but it is not proven to be a deficiency 
thereby. The rejection of tyranny, even the judgement that it is tyranny, 	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 George Grant, Lament for a Nation (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1970), 
85. 
9 Ibid., 85-86. 
10 Ibid., 96.
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is rooted in a tradition. The reference to philosophy implies that a philo-
sophical account of the deficiency of this sort of universal would itself be 
a universal account, not a rejection of universality, though such a univer-
sal account would have to involve a different sort of universality without 
the deficiency indicated by imperial tyranny. It might justify what is valid 
in a particular tradition, but the grounds for this justification would them-
selves have to be independent of any particular tradition. The defence of 
particularity in Lament for a Nation does not extend to such a philo-
sophical account—which implies a critique of deficient universality and 
reliance upon, ultimately, an account of genuine universality. It is this 
implication that led Grant’s work on. He was not satisfied with a defence 
of particularity that could not be made philosophically, that is to say uni-
versally, defensible. 
 A few short years later, again addressing the fate of Canada 
within American imperialism, Grant wrote his clearest and most-quoted 
defence of particularity: 
 
In human life there must always be place for love of the good 
and love of one’s own. Love of the good is man’s highest end, 
but it is of the nature of things that we come to know and to love 
what is good by first meeting it in that which is our own—this 
particular body, this family, these friends, this woman, this part 
of the world, this set of traditions, this civilization. At the sim-
plest level of one’s own body, it is clear that one has to love it 
yet pass beyond concentration on it.11 
 
This formulation begins with a statement expressed in pure universality, 
love of the good, and then goes on to assert the necessity that this univer-
sal be instantiated in a particular good. Such particular goods are one’s 
access to the universal. Without them, the universal good cannot become 
known to particular humans. Nevertheless, to become obsessed with 
one’s own particulars, to fail to pass beyond them, is to be cut off from 
universality and, thus, from complete humanity. Note that in this formu-
lation the first move is from pure universality to its necessary particular 
	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 George Grant, “Canadian Fate and Imperialism,” in Technology and Empire 
(Toronto: Anansi, 1969), 73. 
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instantiation, and the second move is from particularity toward the uni-
versal.  
 To this familiar Platonic formulation of participation in univer-
sals through levels of approximation, Grant adds the pathos of the “first 
meeting” in what may be his most characteristic philosophical contribu-
tion: for if there is no first meeting, a human life is deprived not only of 
the particulars which might express its meaning, but of reference to the 
universals from which meaning is derived, and thus of humanity itself. It 
should, perhaps, be added that it would be more exact to call this a Neo-
Platonic formulation, insofar as the beginning statement is that of pure 
universality, which, therefore, assumes an accomplished universality, 
whereas in Plato’s work itself, the emphasis is always on the accom-
plishment of universality, a moving-upward rather than a moving-
downward. The primacy of the latter suggests a theological, rather than a 
philosophical, discourse insofar as the predicative existence of the high-
est is taken as given.  
 Grant goes on to speak of an “open conflict” between particular 
and universal: 
 
Canada could only continue to be if we could hold some alterna-
tive social vision to that of the great republic. Yet such an alter-
native would have to come out of the same stream—western cul-
ture. Indeed our failure to find such an alternative is bound up 
with the very homogenizing path of western history.12 
 
An alternative vision of the good would require access to universality 
devoid of deficiency that could reveal the source of deficiency in an im-
perial universal and would take a less hostile approach to particular tradi-
tions. Therefore, 
 
what lies behind the small practical question of Canadian nation-
alism is the larger context of the fate of western civilization. By 
that fate I mean not merely the relations of our massive empire 
to the rest of the world, but even more the kind of existence 
	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Ibid., 73, 74. 
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which is becoming universal in advanced technological soci-
eties.13 
 
This defence of particularity attains a philosophical dimension by being 
put into relation with universality and implying, if not articulating fully, 
that a distinction needs to be made between two sorts of universals—
deficient versus genuine, as we have said, but this could be only a first 
approximation. It still needs to be shown in exactly what way they differ, 
though it is already evident that it is the relation to particularity that de-
fines the difference, a relation that is manifested in the pathos of a first 
meeting. 
 Grant’s formulations thus rework the relationship between par-
ticularity and universality through the pathos of a first meeting in which 
particularity is discounted. Philosophical elaboration of this relationship 
requires a distinction between deficient and genuine universals through 
the capacity of the latter to embody a non-tyrannical, non-imperial rela-
tion to particulars. The critical thrust of the pathos of the first meeting 
points to the relevant deficiency: It is demanded of the individual in 
technological civilization to treat his/her particular attachments as 
“merely particular,” that is to say, irrelevant to the universal, rather than 
as “necessary” in the sense of a necessary route to the universal. Of 
course, it is essentially necessary that there be more than one route to-
ward the universal. To be a universal, a universal must apply to a set of 
particulars. To be perceived as a universal, only one member of this set 
need serve as a route even though there is a corresponding set of routes 
toward the universal beginning from each particular in the set. The ne-
cessity in question is thus the necessity of a route, one of a plurality of 
available routes, not that any one route might itself be necessary. The pa-
thos of the first meeting may thus be described as that which prevents a 
passage from a given particular toward the universal, and therefore cuts 
off the one whose particularity is so discounted from access to the uni-
versal. This critical thrust depends upon the possibility of a passage from 
particular to universal that is not thus prevented, toward a universal that 
is therefore not deficient, and that might be experienced in joy and affir-
mation instead of in pathos. Such joy is expressed in the classical ideal of 
beauty, in which the passage toward universality is affirmed. A parallel, 	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Ibid., 78. 
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more contemporary, role of art may be here discerned which would point 
to the pathos of cancellation, of the loss and alienation experienced when 
no such route is available. 
 To follow Grant in his reworking of the relation between particu-
larity and universality implies a logic of distinction between deficient 
and genuine universals containing an account both of a genuine universal 
itself and of the cancellation process whereby other universals are regis-
tered as deficient. Grant’s critical work focussed on this latter task in 
order to skewer the homogenisation by which technological civilization 
cancelled passage from some particular roots, namely, the Canadian tra-
dition, toward the universal. While he was well aware that an account of 
the passage toward a genuine universal was required by his critiques, I 
cannot find any expression of  this passage in a philosophically adequate 
form. Most often, he here took refuge in art, referring to Mozart, for ex-
ample, as “the lute of God,” to express a beautiful embodiment of the 
universal, an embodiment which itself provides the passage in question.14  
 
2. The Object of Art as a Universalisation Embedded in Particulars 
 
One should not overlook the possibility that a recourse to art at this point 
is not at all arbitrary or an indication of failure, especially because, since 
Kant, art has been understood as the realm of a universalisation that can-
not be made independently of its particular embodiment. Kant distin-
guished between a “determinate judgment” in which a particular is sub-
sumed under an existent universal law, and a “reflective judgment” in 
which the universal is not pre-given, but must be given in the judgement 	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 George Grant, “Faith and the Multiversity,” 132–33n.4, where he attributes 
the phrase to Heidegger. It comes originally from fragment 366 of “The Cheru-
bic Wanderer” by Angelus Silesius, where it is said that “A heart that is calm in 
its ground. God-still, as he will, / Would gladly be touched by him: it is his lute-
play.” Heidegger quotes this passage and applies it to Mozart; see Heidegger, 
The Principle of Reason, (tr.) Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1996). This is likely the Heidegger reference that Grant had in mind since 
he was strongly influenced by this text, which he read in French prior to 1972 
(as I recall from remarks he made in his graduate course on technology at 
McMaster University in Fall 1972), and was passionate about the music of Mo-
zart.  
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itself.15 Such a judgement is not accomplished through subsumption but 
is a judgement of an individual that implies a not-yet-given universal. 
 
A representation which, as individual and apart from comparison 
with others, yet has an agreement with the conditions of univer-
sality which it is the business of the understanding to apply, 
brings the cognitive faculties into that proportionate accord 
which we require for all cognition, and so regard as holding for 
everyone who is determined to judge by means of understanding 
and sense in combination (i.e., for every man).16 
 
Aesthetic judgement involves a “free play of the imagination and the 
understanding” in which the particularity necessary or passage toward 
the universal is sensuously present such that “the feeling in the judgment 
of taste comes to be imputed to everyone, so to speak, as a duty.”17 Art 
might well be the realm in which the affirmation or cancellation of the 
passage to universality is most evident due precisely to the necessary 
embeddedness of universalisations in sensuous experience. 
 A sensuous universalisation, though it is imputed universally, 
cannot demand the actual agreement of others, but can merely ask for or 
woo it.18 This is because it is rationalising in the sense that it “proclaims 	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, (tr.) J. H. Bernard (New York: Mac-
millan, 1951), introduction, section IV. 
16 Ibid., 54. 
17 Ibid., 52, 138. 
18 “Ask” is the translation by J.H. Bernard in Kant’s Critique of Judgment, 74. 
“Woo” is the more evocative translation by Hannah Arendt in her groundbreak-
ing application of Kant’s concept of aesthetic judgement to political judgement. 
See Hannah Arendt, “The Crisis in Culture,” in Between Past and Future (New 
York: Viking, 1961), 222. The German word in question here is “wirbt,” from 
the verb werben (“recruit” or “enlist”), whose meaning, when followed by “um,” 
is “to court, to woo, to make love to, to sue for, to ask for (a girl’s hand in mar-
riage).” (Schöffler/Weiss Deutsch-Englisch Wörterbuch) Thus, Arendt’s transla-
tion is not only more telling but also more accurate. The complete sentence in 
question is: “Man wirbt um jedes anderen Beistimmung, weil man dazu einen 
Grund hat, der allen gemein ist; auf welche Beistimmung man auch rechnen 
könnte, wenn man nur immer sicher wäre, dass der Fall unter jenem Grunde als 
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itself as universal, for as such it can serve as the major premise of a syl-
logism.”19 In contrast, a straightforwardly rational and universal judge-
ment is the conclusion to a syllogism. One thus reasons from a univer-
salising, rationalising judgement, whereas one reasons toward a universal 
and rational one. It is thus necessary that a sensuous embodiment percep-
tible by all stand as the starting point from which such rationalising can 
proceed and which will have no definitive termination. For Kant, this 
was the artwork, though it seems clear that other such recognised exem-
plars can function identically under certain determinate conditions.20 
Reason, in the sense of a universalising and rationalising judgement, re-
quires both an exemplary sensuous embodiment and a claim to universal 
acknowledgement even though such a claim is always underway and in 
principle can be rationally contested.  
 I do not want to suggest by this reference to Kant that aesthetic 
judgement so understood simply resolves the problem of deficient and 
genuine universals central to Grant’s logic or, even less, to suggest that 
this formulation influenced him. My point is rather, in a narrow optic, 
that Grant’s references to art, and especially Mozart, play a significant 
role in his critique of technological civilization. In a larger optic, such a 
reference to art, even directly to Kant’s aesthetics, has been the dominant 
locus within which this problem has been addressed in contemporary 
philosophy. For example, Max Horkheimer and Hannah Arendt each in-
dependently regarded Kant’s Critique of Judgment as a fundamental 
starting point for rethinking the relation between particular and universal 
required by the formalism of scientific-technological reason.21 Moreover, 
Hans-Georg Gadamer has emphasised that the German tradition stem-	   	   _______________________	  
Regel des Beifalls richtig subsumiert ware.” Immanuel Kant, Kritik der 
Urteilskraft (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1963), 79. 
19 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 182n.1. 
20 The term “exemplar” is from W. B. Gallie’s important and influential article 
“Essentially Contested Concepts,” in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
Vol. LVI (London: Harrison and Sons, 1956), which, though without reference 
to Kant, seems to aim at fixing the universal conditions of universalising judge-
ment precisely in Kant’s sense. 
21 Max Horkheimer, Kants kritik der urteilskraft als bindeglied zwischen theore-
tischer und praktischer philosophie (Stuttgart: Verlag von W. Kohlhammer, 
1925), and Hannah Arendt, Life of the Mind, Vol. 1, Willing (New York: Har-
court, Brace, Jovanovich, 1978), appendix, “Judging.” 
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ming from Kant eviscerated the social and political content of English 
moral philosophy and the French use of “le bon sense” in favour of a 
purely theoretical faculty of judgement.22 In this sense, one can interpret 
the twentieth-century uses of Kant to uncover the relation between sen-
suous embodiment and universalisation as returning to a central problem 
of reason in humanistic philosophy rather than a radical departure. 
 The culture of technological civilization has been diagnosed by 
Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno as one in which “the whole and 
the parts are alike; there is no antithesis and no connection,” so that what 
Grant calls the “particular” shows, in their terms, “the non-specificity of 
the example.”23 The consequence for particularity of the problem of sub-
sumption was defined by Adorno as the philosophy of identity, in which 
“the concept of the particular is always its negation at the same time; it 
cuts short what the particular is and what nonetheless cannot be directly 
named, and it replaces this with identity.”24 This suggestion that the par-
ticular as a concept is itself deficient because it implies a cancelling of 
the particularity of the particular in favour of a subsuming universal may 
well be seen as a confirming reverse image of Grant’s defence of particu-
larity—though it differs in implying that universals are always subsum-
ing in this sense and, therefore, that the problem lies in conceptual uni-
versality itself (as we will also see in the case of “singularity” below). 
Tellingly, Adorno looked to aesthetics for “reciprocal relations between 
universal and particular where the universal is not imposed on the par-
ticular from outside but emerges from the dynamic of particularities 
themselves.”25 The larger optic of twentieth-century philosophy demands 
a non-cancelled particular and a non-deficient universal to address the in-
sufficiency of technological civilization as expressed in its formal-
technical conception of reason. In his critique of formal logic, Edmund 
Husserl asked whether “the analytico-formal theory must be supple-
mented by a material theory,” a transcendental aesthetics of greater 	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Crossroad, 1975), 25–
38. 
23 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, (tr.) 
John Cumming (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 126, 10. 
24 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, (tr.) E. B. Ashton (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1973), 173; on subsumption, see ibid., 11. 
25 Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, (tr.) C. Lenhardt (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1984), appendix III, 481. 
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scope than the Kantian because it referred to “any possible world as a 
world given in pure experience,” whose task is “the genetical tracing of 
predicative evidences back to the non-predicative evidence called experi-
ence.”26 Such a material phenomenology would account for the experien-
tial encounter with particulars as not only the foundation of formal logic 
and the practice of logical subsumption, but as the locus of reason in the 
lived world, that is to say, a non-deficient and embodied universality. 
 Examples and citations of rethinking and expansion of the Kant-
ian problem of embodied universalisation could be multiplied. The point 
here is to notice the larger optic within which the problem of passage 
from particular to universal that Grant diagnosed is shared in its general 
form by many other contemporary philosophers, and that it is the specific 
manner in which their philosophies address this problem that defines 
their distinctive approaches. One important difference here is that the 
tradition of German Idealism, up to and including Adorno, locates the is-
sue of a particular embodied universalisation paradigmatically in the 
sphere of the aesthetic, whereas the phenomenological tradition attempts 
a retrieval of the particular through experience and thought, which con-
sequently has implications without restriction within technological 
civilization. This is because the issue of the particular is discovered 
through a critique of technology and universal-formal reason in phenom-
enology, whereas Adorno follows German Idealism in posing the opposi-
tion between art and technology from within the utopia of the aesthetic.27 
Grant would have to be on the phenomenological side of this difference, 
since a solely aesthetic retrieval of the particular would eviscerate his 
opposition to Canada’s integration into the universal and homogeneous 
empire of technology. Whatever the role of art in articulating the particu-
lar embodied universal for Grant, its significance extends without restric-
tion to the whole experienced world. 
 
 	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Edmund Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, (tr.) Dorion Cairns (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), 149, 292, 209 (italics and scare quotation 
marks removed). 
27 See, on this point, Reiner Schürmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting: From 
Principles to Anarchy, (tr.) Christine-Marie Gros (Bloomington: Indiana Uni-
versity Press, 1987), 368–69n.47.  
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3. Particularity and Singularity 
 
The retrieval of particularity in Grant’s work thus converges with an 
identical theme of the oppressive inadequacy of formal-technical reason 
in the tradition of Kantian aesthetics, including its recent influence on 
Adorno and Horkheimer, and that of phenomenology. Important as 
Grant’s references to art are, his critique of technology agrees with that 
of phenomenology in refusing to locate the retrieval of particularity 
within aesthetics, even paradigmatically so, and thus strives to express it 
in thought. Thus, I want to reconsider and clarify Grant’s retrieval of par-
ticularity by comparing it with the related concept of “singularity” that 
Reiner Schürmann, in following the implications of the Heideggerian cri-
tique of technology, argues is the destiny of particularity.  
 Philosophical use of the term “singularity” originated with Duns 
Scotus’s argument against the proposition that God cannot be known 
through a concept common to himself and other creatures since 
“Socrates, in so far as he is Socrates, is singular” because “the singularity 
of a thing is no impediment to the abstraction of a common concept.”28 In 
this sense, a singularity is a thing insofar as it is that thing and not an-
other. A singularity may be a particular in the sense that Socrates is, like 
many others, a man, or a human being or an animal. A particular may be 
subsumed under many universals of different types, but when a particular 
is considered not as an instance of a kind but rather as the one that it is it-
self, then it is a singular. A singular is thus differentiated from a particu-
lar in that a particular is an instance of a relevant concept, whereas a sin-
gular can be considered as several particulars depending on the universal 
in question. This is one reason Grant’s use of the term “particularity” to 
designate a reversal from a tyrannical universal may be considered theo-
retically inadequate: a particular can be defined as a particular only in re-
lation to a relevant universal, whereas reference to the thing in its con-
crete being must include its possibility of being subsumed under more 
than one universal. In this sense, a singular may be considered the to-
tality of such particulars determined by universals. Nonetheless, this is a 
secondary concept because a singular is not in the first place derived 	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Duns Scotus, Philosophical Writings, (ed. and tr.) Allan Wolter (Edinburgh: 
Nelson, 1963), 32–33. 
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from a plurality of particulars, but is, rather, the thing itself prior to the 
abstraction of a type—in phenomenological terms, we may say “the ex-
perienced thing” or “the thing in its living presence,” to refer to a fulfil-
led intuition.  
 Contemporary use of the concept of singularity in general de-
rives from Kant’s Critique of Judgment, in which, in Samuel Weber’s 
account, the “singularity of the object [which] resists all attempts to sub-
sume it under general concepts also precludes the establishment of a dis-
cipline of literary studies or of literary criticism” and leads to the concept 
of iterability as used by Jacques Derrida, in which “[t]he iterability of a 
literary—or a psychoanalytic—interpretation, for instance, entails alter-
ation as much as it does recurrence.”29 For Weber, the “unravelling of 
form” in Kant’s Third Critique is coincident with Heidegger’s account of 
the truth of the work of art.30 This characteristic assumption of the iden-
tity of a phenomenological and Kantian account of singularity is one of 
the assumptions that this essay seeks to question, however much it may 
describe accurately the use of the concept of singularity in current French 
philosophy to combine the Kantian influence with the Heideggerian one 
to describe an emergence in which the distinction between particular and 
universal, of case/example versus concept/type, does not emerge as 
such.31  
 In Reiner Schürmann’s usage, singularisation is an anticipatory 
name for that which is manifested at the end of metaphysics, for the oc-	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Samuel Weber, “Ambivalence: The Humanities and the Study of Literature,” 
in Institution and Interpretation: Expanded Edition (Stanford: Stanford Univer-
sity Press, 2001), 141, 142.  
30 Samuel Weber, “The Unraveling of Form,” in Mass Mediauras (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1996), 15–30. 
31 In this vein of combining phenomenological and Kantian conceptions, Jean-
Luc Nancy describes singularity in this way: “What is a singularity, if not each 
time its ‘own’ clearing, its ‘own’ immanence, the immanence of a ‘propriety’ or 
propriety itself as immanence, always touched upon, always lightly touched: re-
vealing itself beside, always beside.” Jean-Luc Nancy, “Of Being Singular Plu-
ral,” in Being Singular Plural, (tr.) Robert D. Richardson and Anne E. O’Byrne 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 7. It remains possible, of course, 
that Nancy has not simply combined these, but forged a synthesis that reconciles 
and drives beyond these sources. I will not investigate this possibility in this es-
say. 
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currence in leaping whereby a subsumed particularity becomes a singu-
larity, for the negativity that attends the finitude of an event, which is the 
undoing of technological civilization. It is thus a key concept that adds to 
Heideggerian terminology and determines his interpretation of Heideg-
ger. Three aspects of singularity can be distinguished here under the 
headings of ontological difference, singularity and negativity. 
 The ontological difference between beings and Being allowed 
Heidegger to initiate thinking on the epoch of metaphysics in which Be-
ing receded to an abstract category behind the disclosure of beings. The 
ontological difference thus “operates like a corrosive and disjoins the 
jointings by which entities have been colligated into being as particulars 
are into a universal or as the transcended is into the transcendental.”32 
Through the phenomenology of the ontological difference, particular-
universal relationships are prised apart to reveal what Schürmann calls a 
“jointing.” The sense of “prising” that Shürmann proposes as a compo-
nent of phenomenology can be understood through Heidegger’s descrip-
tion of the dependence of thought on manifestation: “But if things had al-
ready ever shown themselves qua things in their thingness, then the 
thing’s thingness would have become manifest and would have laid 
claim to thought.”33  Jointings seal particular-universal relations within a 
metaphysical frame and can become unsealed through the direction of 
phenomenological inquiry toward the constitution of thing and world. 
This inquiry suggests a singularisation toward “heeding this pitcher, this 
bridge, for its own sake as its world comes to pass in it.”34 Such inquiry 
emerges from a leap out of metaphysics, which is the existential trajec-
tory that, in Heidegger’s words, “brings thinking into a play with that 
wherein being qua being finds its repose.”35 “Singularity” in this sense is 
an anticipatory name for that which thinking leaps toward. 
 Singularity emerges from particularity insofar as the epoch that 
confines particularity to a case of a universal recedes as the jointings 
come unsealed. Beginning from what I called above a “cancelled particu-	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Schürmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting, 214. 
33 Martin Heidegger, “The Thing,” in Poetry, Language, Thought, (tr.) Albert 
Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 170. 
34 Schürmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting, 214. 
35 Martin Heidegger, The Principle of Reason, (tr.) Reginald Lilly (Blooming-
ton: Indiana University Press, 1996), 111. 
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lar,” a particular which remains a particular but whose relation to a uni-
versal is cancelled, one may begin to capture a particularity on the way to 
becoming a singular. Thinking the particular as particular in this manner 
“allows one to think of things not according to their unchangeable es-
sence, but in their singularity, unheard of since the Greeks.”36 One may 
note at this point a difference between Schürmann’s formulation and that 
which I ventured above in following the implications of George Grant’s 
thought. For Schürmann, the epochal stamp of metaphysics operates as a 
jointing of particulars to universals. The leap initiates a dislocating of 
particulars, such that thinking the particular as particular leaps toward 
singularity. For Grant, it is the cancelled particular, the particular denied 
a relation to universality, that provokes an embracing of that particu-
larity. In the first case, it is the subsumption of particulars, whereas in the 
second case it is the cancellation of them, not through subsuming them 
but by, so to speak, failing to subsume or include them, that makes pos-
sible the leap. A related difference is that it may appear that in the first 
case it is subsumption of particulars universally that opens toward a leap, 
whereas for Grant it is one’s attachment to a specific cancelled particular 
that is crucial. (Given that subsumption is also the key element for 
Adorno’s critique, it contains a kindred relation to the Heideggerian leap 
to singularity despite the difference that, unlike in Heidegger, it is articu-
lated from an aesthetic conception—such that philosophy becomes the 
construction of “constellations” on an aesthetic model. “What the philo-
sophical concept will not abandon is the yearning that animates the non-
conceptual side of art, and whose fulfilment shuns the immediate side of 
art as mere appearance. The concept—the organon of thinking, and yet 
the wall between thinking and the thought—negates that yearning.”37) 
Similarly, whereas Grant’s retrieval of particularity involves the desire 
for a new, more adequate universal that would no longer cancel some 
particulars, Schürmann’s leap toward singularity involves a de-
hegemonizing of universality as such that would liberate the particular 
from its relation to universality through its transformation into singu-
larity. Attachment to a particular appears crucial to preparing a leap in 
either case. Nonetheless, there remains a difference between the two ac-
counts: Grant turns “back” toward the cancelled particular in a manner 	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Schürmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting, 213. 
37 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 15. 
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that motivates thinking on given deficient universals and new universali-
sations. In contrast, singularisation occurs in that leaping in which a par-
ticularity strains away from its subsumption to universality and toward 
becoming a singularity. 
 Schürmann clarifies his thinking on this point through a reflec-
tion on the work of Marcel Duchamp, specifically his bicycle wheel 
mounted on a stool for exhibit in a museum.38 Schürmann’s leap is pre-
pared by a particular that resists subsumption in the way that the bicycle 
mounted on a stool resists universalisation through either the mobility of 
the bicycle or the stationary character of the stool. This double and irre-
concilable pull exemplifies the doubly nomic law, the double bind that 
defines tragedy for Schürmann and which is denied in the hegemonic 
fantasm of metaphysics. Thus, the differend, “in its place of emergence, 
expresses a conflict between a thesis of the same and a non-thetic other, 
the conflict of ultimates.”39 The singular is the “belonging to no genus”40 
whose emergence is pointed to by an inscription of a double-and-
conflicting-with-no-escape differend such as Duchamp’s.   The singulari-
sation of which Schürmann speaks doesn’t turn back toward the particu-
lar in the manner of Grant so much as press outward from a differend. 
Grant’s critique expresses itself through critiques of cancellation from 
universality, whereas Schürmann’s expresses itself through an anticipa-
tion of singularity.41  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Reiner Schürmann, Broken Hegemonies, (tr.) Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2003), 618. 
39 Ibid., 32. 
40 Ibid., 619. 
41 Peyman Vahabzadeh has interpreted “the emergence of particularities as we 
witness in the new social movements,” which are described in contemporary 
sociology, as anticipations of singularity in Schürmann’s sense. “Such articula-
tions of experiences [in new social movements] are genuine…in their singu-
larity, and not subsumed or subsumable, by force, under a universal. In short, it 
is genuine in the sense that it is nonhegemonic.” See his Articulated Experi-
ences: Toward a Radical Phenomenology of New Social Movements (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 2003), 156, 179. The comparison with 
Grant that I explore here would suggest thinking together cancellation with dif-
ferend in social movements. It would seem that some existential encounter with 
cancellation would be necessary to bring the Duchamp-like encounter with 
double binds into the social realm. 
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 One may well suspect that a specific particular is crucial to pre-
paring the leap, in the sense that Duchamp’s object does in this example, 
especially since the notion of particulars preparing the leap universally 
seems self-contradictory, not only in a logical sense but, more import-
antly, in an existential one. It is the crucial role of the differend as a par-
ticular motivating the leap that distinguishes Schürmann’s account at this 
point from Heidegger’s, and allows him to introduce the concept of sin-
gularity cognate to French Heideggerianism through an appreciation of 
double binds within technological civilization. Despite Schürmann’s 
comprehensive interpretation of Heidegger, the influence of Nietzsche is 
in certain crucial contexts more telling. One can contrast Nietzsche’s 
phrase “God is dead,” for example, with Heidegger’s famous remark  in 
the Spiegel interview that “only a god can save us. The only possibility 
available to us is that by thinking and poeticizing we prepare a readiness 
for the appearance of a god, or for the absence of a god in [our] decline 
insofar as in view of the absent god, we are in a state of decline.”42 Inso-
far as “god” stands here for the hegemonic ordering principle, the differ-
ence implied is that for Nietzsche no new principle is possible whereas 
for Heidegger the possibility is at least left open. As Michel Harr has 
shown, Schürmann’s interpretation of Heidegger takes his position to be 
equivalent to Nietzsche’s, thus closing down the possibility of a new 
epoch of Being that, at least at some points in Heidegger’s work, remains 
open. This difference means that “Schürmann takes Nietzsche’s side 
against Heidegger in showing that for Nietzsche the original chaotic es-
sence of forces is only provisionally hidden by the fiction of schemes, 
unities, and forms, whereas for Heidegger, tragedy is reduced to the 
merely principal conflict of the ontological doubleness (pres-
ence/absence) of aletheia. In Schürmann’s last thinking, the task of phi-
losophy is to dismantle the hegemonic economies of the past in showing 
that they are the consequence of the oblivion not of aletheia, but of our 
tragic and mortal condition. ”43  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Martin Heidegger, “Only a God Can Save Us,” (tr.) William J. Richardson, in 
Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker, (ed.) Thomas Sheehan (Chicago: Prece-
dent Publishing, 1981), 57. 
43 Michel Harr, “The Place of Nietzsche in Reiner Schürmann’s Thought and in 
His Reading of Heidegger,” Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal, vol. 19, no. 
2–vol. 20, no. 1, 1997, 244. 
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 The third aspect of singularity in Schürmann’s account refers to 
the finitude of a constellation of world and things as it comes to pass in 
an event. Such coming to pass involves also its losing sway through its 
inherent negativity. “It brings into focus, not the present particular, but a 
particular presencing as particular, that is, as permeated with its unique 
negativity.”44 Such negativity, understood in a Heideggerian way, is an 
absencing or withdrawing co-constituted in a manifestation or an appear-
ing as it appears. 
 
While “unconcealment”…indicates general constellations of 
presence endowed with a certain duration, its anticipatory inci-
dence, the “event,” scatters the general, disregards even the par-
ticular thing, and fragments any thought-content other than this 
or that presencing singularized by its distinct absencing. Such 
plurification is impossible to transcend and thinkable only as a 
movement of “rising” or “clearing.”45 
 
Absencing, or negativity, attends singularity in its appearance in an 
event. Singularity in this sense is the finitude through which a thing 
withdraws into a concealment coincident with its manifestation. Such ab-
sencing is the specific negativity of the singularity corresponding to its 
unique singularity. 
 There are, then, three related differences in the accounts: One, 
Grant’s retrieval of particularity turns “backward” to what has been can-
celled by a universality, whereas Schürmann’s “singularity” is consti-
tuted through a leap “forward” out of metaphysics. Two, the retrieval of 
particularity anticipates a new, genuine universal which would not cancel 
any relevant particulars, whereas the leap toward singularity anticipates a 
new non-hegemonic realm without subsumption, that is to say, without 
universals, without genus and, therefore, also without particularities. It 
thus implies, unlike Grant’s account, that the critique of technological 
civilization requires a critique of universality as such rather than a cri-
tique of deficient universals. Three, while both accounts are stimulated 
non-universally, that is to say, by specific examples, in one case it is a 
“cancelled particular,” while in the other it is the differend, the “doubly 	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Schürmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting, 219. 
45 Ibid. 
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nomic,” the tragic double bind. The latter opens up a role for avant-garde 
art that is lacking in Grant’s conception. 
 
4. A Five-Step Existential-Temporal Logic 
 
Grant’s Canadian nationalism in the context of his Christian Platonism is 
what is specific to his diagnosis of the blocking of the passage in the pa-
thos of a first meeting, but it leaves insufficiently addressed the distinc-
tion between deficient and genuine universals. The predominant direc-
tion of such a search for a genuine, non-deficient universal has often 
been routed into art but, while it may learn from this route, it needs to 
pertain to the entirety of practical action within technological civiliza-
tion. Grant’s work, insofar as it turns back from formal universals toward 
embodied universalisation as the locus of philosophical reflection, con-
tains a polemical interest in, at least, reassessing and, at most, justifying 
particular attachments as expressed in local traditions and forms of in-
habitation. It is the logic of this central thread in Grant’s work that I have 
followed here beyond his own formulations. In previous work, I have 
called this “an embracing of particularity,” which is an existential deci-
sion to value particularity that occurs in the situation of its endanger-
ment, and which, I have argued, was not recognised by Grant as an op-
erative factor in the conceptual basis of the critique of deficient univer-
sals.46 The motivation of this decision is rooted in the cancellation of a 
specific particularity but extends to a philosophical questioning about 
particularity as such. A decision is possible, even within technological 
civilization, but that is not of it, to take such attachments seriously, to 
live one’s life in a struggle to discover what of universals can be found 
through these particulars. It contains the risk of being cut off from those 
universals deriving from the tradition that perhaps cannot be discovered 
in one’s own particular attachments. This is an existential-temporal logic, 	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 This observation was first made in my article, “Crossing the Border,” The 
Massachusetts Review, special issue on Canada, vol. XXXI, no. 1–2 (Spring-
Summer 1990), 42. Its use in clarifying the relation between particularity in 
Grant’s sense and Heidegger’s conception of a “step back” (schritt zurück) was 
developed further in my A Border Within, 132, 160–61 and 201–02, and was 
used to define multiculturalism philosophically as “the universalization of a 
right to particularity within a pluri-cultural, unilingual framework.” See Angus,  
A Border Within, 146. 
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based in a decision, that might ground a new, genuine universal—and 
also might fail to find assent—and thus is currently suspended at the 
moment of universalisation.47  
 I want to parse this existential-temporal logic into five steps that 
address the passage from a cancelled particular toward a new universali-
sation. It should be recalled that the situation of this logic is a prior 
awareness, articulating into a judgement, that the dominant formal-
technical universality is deficient in its relation to particulars. These steps 
introduce two intermediate concepts—specifically, border and localisa-
tion—that do not figure in the work of Grant, nor that of Schürmann.48 
 The first step is an embracing of one’s own particularity, a deci-
sion to value and explore it, which does not deny universality but also 
does not yet thematise the relations of this particularity to a non-deficient 
possibility of universalisation, remaining with the exploration of the 
value of a specific particularity in its specificity. This occurs through a 
reversal of the dominant particular-universal relations and implies a 
marginalisation from hegemonic conceptions.  
 The second step occurs when the investigation of a particularity 
as particularity is experienced as lacking in universality of address such 
that the necessity to include other particularities as particularities emer-
ges within the existential logic. This is a step back from the constituted 
relations between particularity and universality so that the relation of 
universality to the embracing of a plurality of particularities is themati-
	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 This existential decision thus initiates what Heidegger calls the leap out of 
metaphysics where “[t]he leap leaps through the realm between beings and be-
ing.” Martin Heidegger, The Principle of Reason, 78 and passim. 
48 The existential logic that I propose here is a formalisation of my investigations 
following up this problematic, which appear  in several different contexts. The 
texts in question here are my A Border Within, 126–28, 137–38 and 155–62, and 
(Dis)figurations: Discourse/Critique/Ethics (London and New York: Verso, 
2000), 77–87. These initial formulations were pursued in a phenomenology of 
locality in Identity and Justice (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 
26–31, which was grounded on an unfulfilled teleology in Heidegger’s late 
thought, published as “Place and Locality in Heidegger’s Late Thought,” Sym-
posium: Journal of the Canadian Society for Hermeneutics and Postmodern 
Thought, vol. V, no. 1 (Spring 2001). 
 
 
 
The Pathos of a First Meeting  199 
 
cally posed.49 At this point, where a plurality of particularities referring 
to a plurality of relevant universals appears, use of the term “particu-
larity” must refer back toward the origin of questioning about subsump-
tion, and the term “singularity” must be introduced to refer teleologically 
toward what the particular may become should it be able to shake free of 
deficient universalisation. The idea of a non-deficient universalisation 
thus appears horizonally even though it as yet lacks all content.  
 The third step consists in the discovery of a difference, or divi-
sion, between particularity and universality that establishes their opposi-
tion through their border. This poses thematically the issue of what 
passes through the border to become formulated in universal terms and 
what is limited to particularity as such. For example, I may belong on the 
rain-drenched West Coast of Canada, but belonging in a place may be a 
universal condition of humans. It is but a short step to localisation, or the 
putting of particularity into relations with other particularities such that 
particularity is not simply opposed to universality but recognised as a 
route toward the universal—a route whose cancellation has now been un-
cancelled. This double negation in localisation is an attunement to uni-
versalisation. It is the ontic ground of ontology, the existential openness 
that allows manifestation of non-deficient universals. While the border is 
	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 I am using here Heidegger’s term “step back” (schritt zurück), which can also 
be called a Destruktion or a deconstruction (Derrida) in the sense that these de-
rive from Husserl’s Rückgang and Abbau (unbuilding). A going-backward, 
noted by Husserl, can only take a spiral form of expression: going back and 
coming forward while retreating back to the “instituted” site under investigation. 
Husserl’s concept of institution (Urstiftung) is the basis for this methodological 
move. See Ian Angus, “Phenomenology as Critique of Institutions: Movements, 
Authentic Sociality and Nothingness,” PhaenEx, vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring-Summer 
2006). Available at http://137.207.120.196/ojs/leddy/index.php/phaenex. De-
fence of one’s own is a “step back from the relation between contingency and 
universality to the conditions under which a specific being might apprehend a 
universal good.” See Angus, A Border Within, 132. The step back was not taken 
by Grant because of his commitment to Christian Platonism; this is a phenome-
nological move which requires a certain distance from the metaphysical tradi-
tion, which is not to say (against Heidegger) from philosophy. See Ian Angus, 
“Socrates and the Critique of Metaphysics,” The European Legacy, vol. 10, no. 
4 (2005). 
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that which is passed, or traversed, localisation is the passage itself, the 
passing onward from particularity toward universalisation.  
 The final step is universalisation itself, a statement of ontology, 
an arguable attempt to court agreement without the assurance of finalisa-
tion. This existential logic thus ends with a certain polemos that is not the 
polemos of one-against-another, or particular against particular, but of 
universalisation-against-universalisation, which is both potentially more 
inclusive and simultaneously potentially more destructive. 50 Its destruc-
tive potential can only be kept under rein through the patient return to 
particularity, and particularities, and a questioning re-stepping through 
the existential logic.  
 The five-step existential-temporal logic of reversal, step back, 
border, localisation and universalisation takes its departure from the can-
cellation of a given specific particularity. As an undoing of this cancella-
tion, it is a critique of the formal, homogeneous universality upon which 
depends the technological empire and an anticipation of a material uni-
versality to come. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The comparison between Grant and Schürmann was intended to high-
light key issues in the critique of technological civilization through their 
different formulations and terminologies. The existential-temporal logic 
formalised above was developed by following through the logic of par-
ticularity beginning from Grant. It remains to investigate whether this 
logic can make a contribution to the critique of technological civilization, 
especially through the introduction of the two intermediate concepts of 
border and localisation. 
 The critique of technological civilization may well begin with a 
singularity, such as Duchamp’s bicycle-stool, but such a double bind that 
shakes hegemonic closure must be constructed, and thus relies on prior 
thought and intuition, as does avant-garde art. But the more generic ori-	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 I have investigated this polemos in “In Praise of Fire: Responsibility, Manifes-
tation, Polemos, Circumspection,” The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and 
Phenomenological Philosophy, vol. 4 (2004). This account also contains a cri-
tique of the Heideggerian ontological difference in asserting the unsurpassability 
of ontic entanglements in ontology.  
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ginal beginning is described by Grant’s notion of a cancelled particular, 
of being-left-out-of the prevailing epochal jointing. The cancelling of 
one’s own particularity, a particularity that cannot be treated as just one 
among others but which is denied its role as a route to universality, is the 
point of departure for an existential-temporal logic in search of a new, 
genuine universalisation. This element of cancellation is absent from the 
concept of singularity. Politically, singularisation is a protest against be-
ing subsumed, whereas particularity is a protest against being “marginal-
ized,” against a powerful, alien other.  
 The border is the difference between particular and universal and 
is thus what initiates the unsettling of the particular from the universal in 
Schürmann’s sense, and then the passage toward singularisation. The 
border is the impossibility of final hegemonic jointing. 
 The embracing of particularity, which entails the risk of being 
cut off from universality, prises apart the jointing of particular and uni-
versal to signify the border, or difference, between them and thus to pose 
the question of subsumption as the central issue of technological civiliza-
tion. The possibility of both a plurality of relevant particulars and of sev-
eral universals or types demands a localisation that poses anew the issue 
of universalisation. Localisation is the putting of one particular in rela-
tion to others. It is thus accomplished as singularisation in Schürmann’s 
sense, with the important difference that locality does not rule out, in 
principle, all reference to universalisation. 
 Existential embracing of the cancelled particular thus draws it 
into singularisation in a manner that does not rule out the possibility of a 
future universalisation. One may say that it illustrates Grant’s non-
cancelled particular by maintaining the possibility of non-deficient uni-
versality. The concept of singularity, or singularisation, insofar as it is 
constituted in an anticipatory leap, puts at the forefront the non-genus, 
because it holds to the possibility that Grant rejected—that universality is 
necessarily tyranny. Singularisation in Schürmann’s sense seeks the re-
gime of non-regime (which can only be realised as philosophy) or, per-
haps more accurately, is, in principle, in protest against any and all re-
gimes (and can be realised as politics). In contrast, the existential-
temporal logic elaborated here situates the cancelling of particularity and 
its embrace as prior to the encounter with singularity, thus relocating it 
before a final risk of universalisation. Beyond protest, there is the neces-
sity to say that Being has driven previous universals as well as the de-
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mand to articulate their deficiency. Universalisation is valid, not only as 
singularisation, nor only as already-existent universality, but as the de-
mand to articulate universally the features of existential temporality, that 
is to say, as philosophy—which is essentially tied to universality. 
 What is the wager here? A new hegemony may fail to include all 
particularities sufficiently and, therefore, the de-jointing would have to 
begin again. But the necessity to begin de-jointing again cannot be 
known in advance. To claim, in principle, the impossibility of adequate 
universalisation is to assert protest as the ultimate stance, which is there-
fore to claim to know in advance the failure of future hegemonies. Such a 
claim to know the failure of all jointings into the future jumps over the 
existential-temporal logic of embracing particularity and posits a princi-
ple, albeit a principle of non-jointing, that would rule throughout all exi-
stential time. Such a positing could only be an assertion without experi-
ential support, a metaphysics asserting the impossibility of metaphysics, 
insofar as metaphysics arises from jointing. If the philosopher is always 
potentially a traitor to any regime by virtue of the universalisation that 
exceeds it, it is nevertheless equally true that such treachery cannot be 
guaranteed in advance and must be earned by the new regime. There can 
be no regime of singularities.  
 It is here that politics, even the thinking of regimes, and philoso-
phy part company. If philosophy is the heeding of singularities that can-
not be joined within a regime, then politics always contains a closure that 
philosophy will want to open. But philosophy, no more than a wanderer 
returning home, can open a door before standing in front of it. For 
philosophy to be done, universality cannot necessarily be tyranny—even 
though all universalities may fail in their turn. This is given in the very 
experience of noticing a cancelled particularity as such. 
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